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Abstract 
Sampling poses an interesting problem in markets with experience goods. Free samples reveal product 
quality and help consumers to make informed purchase decisions (promotional effect). However, 
sampling may also induce consumers to substitute purchases with free consumption (displacement 
effect). We study this trade-o_ in the market for digital music where consumers can sample the quality 
of songs by watching free music videos online. Identification comes from a natural experiment in 
Germany, where virtually all videos that contain music are blocked on a popular video platform due to 
a legal dispute with representatives of the rights-holders. We show that promotional and displacement 
effects cancel out in the sales performance of individual songs, whereas online music videos trigger 
sales of albums. 
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1 Introduction
Information is of special importance in markets with experience goods, where product
quality cannot be completely assessed prior to consumption. Consumers collect external
information from popularity rankings (Tucker and Zhang, 2011; Hendricks et al., 2012),
recommendations (Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan, 2012; Dewan and Ramaprasad,
2012) and from related products whose quality attributes are already known (Hendricks
and Sorensen, 2009). Firms advertise to inform consumers about product quality. A
specific form of advertising is to disclose product quality by letting consumers try (parts
or versions of) the product for free.1 Examples of such advertisements are coupons and
tastings at retail stores, shareware, radio airplay, and music videos. Trying before buying
helps consumers to find out whether product characteristics match their preferences. This
process is usually referred to as sampling.
Disclosing quality with free samples is of course costly. For example, physical experience
goods such as wine or food clearly have non-zero marginal cost. In other cases, such as
digital music, marginal costs are negligible, but consumers may perceive the sampling of
an online music video as a close substitute to actually buying a song, especially if the song
is not consumed repeatedly and via on- and oﬄine channels. Trading-off these costs and
benefits, firms can set the optimal level of sampling, i.e. how much information to disclose
(Jain et al., 1995; Bawa and Shoemaker, 2004; Chellappa and Shivendu, 2005; Halbheer
et al., forthcoming).
However, finding the optimal level of sampling is often not a relevant problem in digital
markets. For example, music and movies files are regularly uploaded to Internet platforms
(which may or may not have licenses for the distribution of such content), leaving the firm
little control about whether and how much product information to disclose (Peitz and
Waelbroeck, 2006; Gopal et al., 2006; Bhattacharjee et al., 2006, 2007). The interesting
question then is if sampling can still be an effective trigger of demand even if the firm
1When quality is costly, advertising may not be credible. Theory suggests two mechanisms to solve this
problem. The firm can either build a reputation for quality in a repeated interaction with the consumer
(Klein and Leﬄer, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984), or directly disclose its true level of quality. The
latter is credible either because it is costly to reveal quality or because firms have an incentive to be
associated with their true quality in a sequential process of quality unraveling in the market (Grossman,
1981; Milgrom, 1981; Dranove and Jin, 2010).
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cannot keep some consumers from consuming the sample instead of buying the product
(Wang and Zhang, 2009).
We study this question in the empirical context of digital music. The easiest way to
find out whether a song matches individual preferences is to search for the song on the
Internet. In most cases, this will lead consumers more or less directly to watching a music
video clip on YouTube.2 Not so in Germany. Because of an ongoing royalties dispute
between YouTube and representatives of the rights-holders, a very large fraction of videos
that contain music cannot be accessed in Germany.3 Much of the same content is easily
accessible in a vast majority of other countries.4
We make use of this unique experiment-like setting to study the link between sampling on
YouTube and purchases at the iTunes store. Identification comes from cross-country and
temporal variation in a difference-in-differences setting, where we look at sales dynamics
in response to changes in the supply of online videos, comparing Germany to nine other
countries. Our sample consists of the daily top 300 songs and albums sold on iTunes
between February 15th and August 26th 2013 in Australia, Austria, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. We also
observe the top 25 country-specific search results on YouTube for each song and day. For
every video we know in which countries it is not available. From this information we
construct a song-level measure of country-specific availability of music videos on Youtube.
We show that the promotional effect of online music videos is big enough to offset sales
displacement of songs even when firms cannot control how intensely consumers sample.
We further show that the displacement effect dominates when products become relatively
more expensive, while the promotional effect dominates when sampling is only informative
about a fraction of product characteristics. Our estimates for the latter suggest that a
2According to an online survey of 3,000 consumers in the US (Nielsen ePanel 2012, http://tinyurl.com/
pssqb8m), the top three ways consumers mostly discover music is through the radio (48%), friends and
relatives (10%), and YouTube (7%). Consumers under the age of 20 listen to music more often on YouTube
(64%) than on the radio (56%), through iTunes (53%) or on CD (50%). Digital stores such as Amazon,
iTunes and Beatport also offer 30–90 seconds samples for free. However search results for songs usually
list music video pages much higher than digital stores. In the case of Google as the search engine, this is
not surprising because YouTube is a Google product.
3See New York Times, ‘Royalty Dispute Stops Music Videos in Germany’, April 2, 2009, http://tinyurl.
com/lck339s.
4More than 60% of the 1000 worldwide most viewed videos (which do not all contain music) are
blocked in Germany, while only 0.9% are not accessible in the US, see http://apps.opendatacity.de/
gema-vs-youtube/en.
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ten percent increase in available videos leads to a two percent increase in sales of the
corresponding album.
Our findings have important implications for policy interventions in the context of digital
piracy. If promotional effects can offset losses even without indirect compensation via roy-
alties or shared advertising revenues, this may mean that restricting unpaid consumption
can have negative effects on overall welfare.
2 A Natural Experiment in the Market for Online Videos
The video platform YouTube provides a unique setting to study the effect of online music
videos on digital music sales. With some 34 million monthly visits from Germany alone
in 2012, YouTube is by far the most popular video portal. The second most popular
video portal in Germany (myvideo.de) only receives 16% of YouTube’s traffic (see table
A.2). A large portion of the most popular videos on YouTube are music video clips. While
YouTube has contracts with rights-holders in most countries, the question of corresponding
compensation is subject to a legal dispute between YouTube and GEMA in Germany.
GEMA (Gesellschaft fu¨r musikalische Auffu¨hrungs- und mechanische Vervielfa¨ltigungs-
rechte, society for musical performing and mechanical reproduction rights) is the state-
authorized (de-facto monopolist) collecting society and performance rights organization in
Germany.5 Collecting societies exist to ensure that royalties from any kind of reproduction
(e.g. physical reproduction, public performance, radio airplay, etc.) arrive at artists and
publishers, making them important institutions for artists, because royalties are a major
part of income, independent of any private contracts with record labels (Kretschmer, 2005).
A large international network of sister collection societies represents the rights of German
artists/publishers in international markets, and GEMA fulfills the role for international
artists/publishers in the German market. That is, virtually every professional musician is
either directly or indirectly a member of GEMA, which is also reflected in the so-called
‘GEMA presumption’, a case law presumption that rights of all musical works are managed
by GEMA.6
5Examples for international counterparts are BMI, ASCAP and SESAC in the United States of America,
PRS in the United Kingdom, SACEM in France and SGAE in Spain.
6See http://tinyurl.com/9d38k88. According to the annual report, GEMA had 67,266 members and
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Since a first agreement between YouTube and GEMA had expired in 2009, there are ongo-
ing negotiations about the appropriate level of compensation. In fear of high subsequent
payments, YouTube began blocking music videos in April 2009.7 Because of the GEMA
presumption, YouTube has large incentives to block every video that contains music.8
Not surprisingly therefore, 60% of the 1000 most viewed videos worldwide are blocked in
Germany, while only 0.9% are not accessible in the US.9
Specific legal issues seem to make it complicated to reach an agreement. According to a
statement by Rolf Budde, member of the GEMA advisory board, Youtube insists on a non-
disclosure agreement.10 Because GEMA is required by law to publish the exact royalty
paying schemes in the Bundesanzeiger, an official publication of the Federal Republic of
Germany (similar to the Federal Register in the United States), this is not feasible.11
Reportedly, because of this deadlocked situation, negotiations have been broken off, and
the involved parties started to consult the arbitration board of the German Patent and
Trademark Office for mediation in January 2013.12
2.1 Supply-Side Reactions
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the GEMA-YouTube dispute is controversial among Ger-
man artists, which may explain why the negotiation strategy of GEMA (democratically
representing its members) appears to be unchanged since 2009.
Some artists seem to believe in the promotional effect of online music videos. For example,
the electro/hip-hop band Deichkind posted a raging comment on their Facebook page after
distributed 692,3 million Euro in royalties in 2012.
7See New York Times, ‘Royalty Dispute Stops Music Videos in Germany’, April 2, 2009, http://tinyurl.
com/lck339s.
8We therefore have no reason to believe that there is an underlying non-random process that leaves some
videos online. See footnote 19 for a detailed discussion.
9See http://apps.opendatacity.de/gema-vs-youtube/en.
10Budde made that statement being a panelist at an industry conference in January 2013. Perhaps ironically
the corresponding video can be found on YouTube: http://tinyurl.com/ndyrprc.
11§13(2), Gesetz u¨ber die Wahrnehmung von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten (UrhWahrnG;
Law on the Administration of Copyright initiated in 1965).
12See http://tinyurl.com/oz2gk4c. This is an official procedure provided in §14 UrhWahrnG. It is worth
noting that YouTube has been claiming that videos are not available “because GEMA has not granted the
respective music publishing rights.” According to a court ruling in February 2014 this is unlawful, because
GEMA is obliged by law to grant rights of use to anybody under reasonable conditions on request (§11
(1) UrhWahrnG, see http://tinyurl.com/qe23yvv). Still, this has introduced GEMA, as a very specific
institution that normally does not operate much in the public focus, to a large audience and turned public
opinion (at least among German Internet users) largely against it.
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finding out that their newly uploaded music video was being blocked.13 Much in contrast,
rap musician Jan Delay and the rockband Element of Crime say in interviews that they
don’t think that a potential promotional effect of YouTube can outweigh losses due to
substitution.14 Accordingly, both argue for an adequate compensation from streaming
services to counteract sales displacement.
Although it is in principle possible for publishers and artists to negotiate independent
contracts with any online and oﬄine licensee, it seems unlikely that individual publishers
and artists drop out of GEMA or their national collecting society to reach agreements with
YouTube in Germany.15 First, royalty income from digital distribution may represent too
small an amount to forgo all other royalty income. Second, by joining a collecting society,
individuals benefit from reduced contracting cost and increased bargaining power. This
is even more beneficial for members of international collecting societies where it can be
especially costly to negotiate with various potential licensees abroad.
Record labels are per definition not members of GEMA and therefore do not receive any
royalty income. On top of a potential positive effect on record sales, they can directly
benefit from advertising revenues generated by YouTube. Not very surprisingly therefore,
representatives of Sony Music and Universal Music have publicly criticized GEMA for not
working more towards an agreement.16
2.2 Demand-Side Reactions
A first natural reaction of consumers would be to search the Internet for alternatives.
Surprisingly, this doesn’t seem to play a big role. Figure 1 shows Google search trends for
the six major platforms for music videos in Germany. While the search term ‘youtube’
13The posting from March 9th, 2012 reads “Whether it’s the record label, YouTube or GEMA, whoever’s
responsible. We want our videos to be seen. Finally get your shit sorted out and do your homework! You
are a barrier to evolution and you are irritating the crap out of us.”, http://tinyurl.com/omeudbe.
14The interview with Jan Delay was published in Der Spiegel 16/2012, http://tinyurl.com/nfzc3fa. In
a interview with Radio Bayern 2, Sven Regener, singer of Element of Crime, says (referring to YouTube):
“A business model based on people who produce the content not getting any money is not a business
model, it’s crap. Otherwise people are welcome to have Kim Schmitz (founder of the filesharing website
Megaupload) sing the songs to them”, see http://tinyurl.com/7j4hk25.
15After careful research, we could only find anecdotal evidence of one case where a band seemingly has opted
out of GEMA. Videos in the official YouTube channel of the successful German punk-rock band ‘Die A¨rzte’
are accessible in Germany. See http://tinyurl.com/ov6ou67 (only in German). It is not clear whether
the band opted out of GEMA. When we asked the management of the band, they did not want to comment
on the issue.
16See billboard.com, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/oz8ms9j.
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Figure 1: Video Portals in Germany
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Figure 2: Unblocking YouTube
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remains fairly stable in our sample period (solid line), search terms related to other video
sites show more variation, but there are no clear positive trends. An explanation could
be that those keywords with less absolute search volume experience more noise. Impor-
tantly however, this suggests that no website has captured significant market share from
YouTube. Some portals like clipfish and tape.tv even show decreasing trends. A sec-
ond way consumers could circumvent the restrictions in Germany is the use of browser
plug-ins or proxy servers that make a computer appear to be based outside of Germany.
Google search data in figure 2 shows that there is some variation in the popularity of such
keywords as ‘unblock youtube’ (and the same phrase in German), but there is no clear
upward or downward trend visible.17 It seems unlikely therefore that our estimates of the
effect of video restrictions on YouTube are largely biased because of endogenous consumer
behavior, at least in the observed period.
Given all these arguments, we conclude that the dispute between GEMA and YouTube is
exogenous to sales in the recording industry. Because of legal issues the reason for not
reaching an agreement is exogenous even to GEMA as a directly involved party. Almost
needless to say, the shock is not only exogenous but relevant. YouTube has repeatedly
produced super stars for the recording industry, e.g. PSY and Justin Bieber. This is
17The regression coefficient of a time trend is -0.58% (s.e. 0.16%) for the English phrase, -0.51% (s.e. 0.25%)
for the German phrase.
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reflected in Billboard’s decision to include YouTube in their formula for the Top 100
starting in February 2013.18
3 Methods and Data
3.1 Identification Strategy
We make use of the natural experiment on YouTube to identify the effect of free sampling
on digital sales. Our setting lets us observe counterfactual sales of songs and albums almost
in the absence of YouTube. For the same song, on the same day, sold in the same (virtual)
store, we observe exogenous differences in the availability of YouTube across countries.
The common terminology in experimental settings refers to treatment and control groups,
and it is distinguished between before and after a treatment. Because all songs/music
videos are affected by the GEMA shock throughout the sample period, we don’t observe
the songs in the treatment group (Germany) in two distinct, discrete states of the world
(before and after the treatment). Instead, we exploit temporal variation in the intensity
of restriction. ‘Before’ and ‘after’ then correspond to ‘less treated’ and ‘more treated’,
respectively. Songs are distributed on a continuum between zero treatment and full treat-
ment. The same song is sometimes treated more, sometimes less because of temporal
differences in the intensity of restriction (new videos being uploaded but not immediately
blocked). For this to work, we need to assume that the assignment to the continuum is
random. We can think of the number of videos being blocked per day as a random process
after controlling for song fixed effects, which for example rules out that videos containing
more or less popular songs are more or less restricted.19
18New York Times, ‘What’s Billboard’s No. 1? Now YouTube Has a Say’, February 20th, 2013, http:
//tinyurl.com/ba5d4ks.
19A close look at the data confirms this. We observe 17,781 videos that are uploaded to YouTube after
the corresponding song has appeared on the iTunes charts for the first time (this is our definition of a
new video) and get restricted in Germany at some point. It takes four days on average until a newly
uploaded video (that eventually gets restricted in Germany either immediately or at some later point)
makes it to the top 25 YouTube search results for a song in some country (mean of new videos per song
and day is .23, median 0). The average new video gets blocked after less than 1.5 days, although note
that the majority of new videos is blocked immediately. Some 9% get restricted at some later point (mean
16.57 days, median 8 days, min 1 day, max 174 days). To test whether the timing of the video being
blocked is systematic, we regress the (log) number of views on YouTube on an indicator of whether a new
video is restricted immediately. It is conceivable that YouTube strategically leaves videos with more clicks
longer online to leverage advertising revenues. However, without an agreement with GEMA this is risky,
since YouTube may face high license fees later. Although the coefficient in a linear probability model with
7
To identify the sampling effect, we have to separate it from four other sources of country-
specific variation: (1) different stages of the product lifecycle, (2) differences in prices (price
elasticities), (3) general taste differences, and (4) differences in YouTube usage. We control
for (1) and (2) using observable measures, assuming that (3) and (4) are time-invariant
(at least in the short time-span of our sample) we can use song, genre and country fixed
effects. On top of that, we include fixed effects for month, calendar week and weekday (all
fixed effects are in the vector Xi,j,t) to capture as much variation as possible.
Assuming a log-linear demand function20, we can identify the sampling effect in a standard
difference-in-differences setting, i.e.
log(Salesi,j,k,t) =α+ β1log(Samplingi,j,t) + β2Germanyi,t
+ β3log(Samplingi,j,t)Germanyi,t +X
′
i,j,tγ + εk,t, (1)
where Salesi,j,k,t are unit sales of song i on album k in country j at day t. Samplingi,j,t
is a song-level measure of availability on YouTube, and Germanyi,t is a dummy indicating
observations from Germany.
3.2 Unit Sales versus Sales Ranks
We do not observe unit sales, but sales ranks. We follow the literature and assume that
the relationship between sales rank and unit sales follows a Pareto distribution (Chevalier
and Goolsbee, 2003):
Sales = aRankb (2)
If data on unit sales and sales ranks were observed, it would be straightforward to estimate
the parameters of (2) by OLS, using
log(Rank) = a˜+
1
b
log(Sales), (3)
song fixed effects is statistically significant (coefficient -.015, standard error clustered on the song level
.001, R¯2 = .086, n=17,781), the effect magnitude is small. Doubling the views decreases the probability
of immediate restriction by only 1.5%. This suggests that there is no major strategic timing of video
restrictions in Germany.
20A log-linear demand function can for example be justified by assuming a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
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where a˜ = −(1/b)log(a). In practice, however, unit sales are often not observed, which is
why scholars have used purchase experiments (Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003; Ghose and
Sundararajan, 2006), insider information (Ghose et al., 2006; Brynjolfsson et al., 2011),
or structural estimation methods (Bajari et al., 2008) to estimate the parameters of the
distribution. Those studies on books and software suggest that b is in the range of −0.8
to −0.9 with standard errors of around 0.04.
Because we are mainly interested in qualitative estimates, it is sufficient to work with
observed ranks. To see this, substitute (1) in (3), such that we can estimate
log(Rank) = a˜+
1
b
(α+ β1log(Samplingi,j,t) + β2Germanyi,t
+ β3log(Samplingi,j,t)Germanyi,t +X
′
i,j,tγ + εk,t). (4)
Although we cannot directly identify β1, β2 and β3, we can still interpret the signs of the
estimated coefficients of (4) because 1/b is assumed to be negative.21
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Collection Process
We analyze data collected during February 15th and August 26th 2013 from two public
Internet sources, Apple’s iTunes Store RSS Feed and the YouTube API.
Apple reports sales ranks of the 300 best selling products in all countries in which it
operates an iTunes store. From this, we drew the bestselling songs and albums in ten
countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and the United States) on a daily basis, leaving us with 3,000 observations per
day and category (songs/albums). Along with sales ranks, we observe prices, release dates,
publishers/record labels, and the album a song belongs to. On the same day, we collected
a list of country-specific search results from a query on artist name and song title for each
unique song on YouTube. We restrict the number of search results on YouTube to 25,
leading to 250 country-specific daily search results per song.22 For each video we observe
21In section 4.3, we give a quantitative interpretation of our coefficient estimates.
22We chose 25 because this is the number of results displayed on the first results page after manually searching
on YouTube. YouTube displays the most popular videos related to the search term, in terms of matching
title, number of views and quality rating.
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Figure 3: Number of Unique Blocked Videos: Germany vs. United States
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graph.
meta information, such as title and number of views, and a list of countries in which it
cannot be viewed.
We exclude ten days for which we have incomplete chart rankings and missing video
information, leaving us with 185 days and 503,028 observations.23
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
To derive a measure of video availability, for every song, we count how many videos that
appear in the search results of all countries are blocked within a specific country, say
Germany. This count ranges from 0 to 225. If every video that appears in at least one
country is also available in Germany, the count would be zero. If the list of search results
is unique across all countries, and all videos are blocked in Germany, then the count would
be 25 ∗ 9 = 225. Figure 3 shows histograms of the number of blocked videos in Germany
and the corresponding measure for the United States. On average, 9.36 videos that show
up in the search results in other countries are not available in Germany. The maximum is
43, i.e. for one song on one day, there are 43 videos showing up as popular search results
in the other nine countries that cannot be viewed in Germany. The difference to the US
23Excluded days are 2/27/2013, 3/4/2013, 3/8/2013, 3/13/2013, 5/9/2013, 5/10/2013, 5/14/2013,
7/14/2013, 7/15/2013 and 8/16/2013. The resulting theoretical number of observations is 555,000 but we
lose another 51,972 observations (9,4 %) due to missing meta and video information.
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Figure 4: Popularity Distribution of Videos
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is striking. The mean number of blocked videos here is 0.10, with a maximum of 20.
Figure 4 shows differences in the popularity of music videos in Germany and other coun-
tries, as measured by the number of views on YouTube. The left-hand panel indicates that
restricted videos in Germany are substantially different from videos that are restricted in
other countries. The German distribution is shifted to the right, i.e. more often viewed
and less niche videos are not available in Germany. It is evident from the right-hand panel
that less extremely popular videos show up in German search results. Accessible videos in
Germany are usually live versions, cover versions, remixes, and so on that receive relatively
less views than professional music videos (see table A.3 for an example).
3.4 Specification
We now detail the operationalization and model specification we use to estimate parame-
ters of equation (4).
Sales Ranks indicate the position in the sales charts. Accordingly we observe discrete
values from 1 to 300, where the top selling product has a value of 1.
Sampling is measured as the number of videos to a specific song that are available in
other countries, but are blocked in the focal country. In the tables below, this variable
is denoted as Log(Restricted). To control for the effect of the denominator, i.e. the
11
number of different search results appearing in other countries, we also report results of
an alternative measure. Share Restricted is the number of restricted videos over the total
number of unique videos for a song in all countries on a day. Before taking the logarithm,
we add 1 to avoid losing observations.
Prices are included based on information about the iTunes retail price at time t. iTunes
has a strict pricing policy, such that we only observe three price categories of songs (see
table A.1). Prices of albums show more variation.24 Because there is little variation in
prices for songs, and the price categories are comparable across countries, we include a
variable that has the value 1 in the low category, 2 in the medium category, 3 in the high
category (see table A.1). In the album model, we include album prices as observed in the
raw data. We control for currency-specific differences using country fixed effects.
Age: To control for the stage of the lifecycle of a product in a given country, we construct a
measure of product age by computing the number of days since the release date. Sometimes
products rank high in the sales charts although they are not yet on the market. This is
the case when preordering is possible. For such products, we define age as zero before
the actual release date. Because the distribution of age is skewed, we take the natural
logarithm, but add 1 to avoid losing observations.
Fixed effects: Note that videos featuring popular songs are likely to be uploaded more
frequently. With more draws from the urn, chances that the top 25 search results vary
across countries increase. YouTube’s automatic filters capture the content of any uploaded
video and almost immediately block it in regions where YouTube does not have an agree-
ment with rights-holders.25 By definition therefore, more variety raises the number of
videos blocked in Germany. We solve this issue by controlling for song fixed effects in
the regression below. Additionally, we include genre, month, calendar week, weekday,
and country fixed effects. We report country-specific constants, where US is the omitted
category. We adjust standard errors to account for correlation within observations of the
same song.
24For example, in the US sample, we observe album prices of 1.29, 2.99, 3.96, 3.99, 4.65, 4.95, 4.99, 5.55,
5.94, 5.99, 6.99, 7.99, 8.99, 9.90, 9.99, 10.99, 11.99, 12.99, 13.99, 14.99, 15.99 and 16.99 USD.
25See http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid. See the discussion in footnote 19.
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4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Baseline Results
Results of an OLS estimation of model (1) are given in Table 1. With fixed effects at the
genre, month, calendar week, and weekday levels, the simple linear regression model fits
the data reasonably well (R
2
= 0.62). The coefficient signs of the control variables are as
expected, the popularity of a song decreases over time and higher priced songs tend to sell
less.26 One interpretation of the country coefficients is that they represent a parameter for
market size. According to equation (4), country fixed effects γ represent country-specific
deviations from the parameter b. A positive coefficient then indicates a smaller market
than the US (the omitted category). That is, in order to be at the top of the iTunes charts
in Switzerland, an artist must sell fewer units than for a number one hit in the US. A
second interpretation is one of controlling for country-specific sales patterns, because we
are at the same time estimating parameters of the sales equation (1). The results reveal
interesting similarities between countries with a common language (Canada, UK and US
/ Germany and Austria / Italy and Switzerland).
We report results for two different measures of video availability. In the first column we
use the number of videos that appear in search results in other countries but are restricted
in the focal country. In the second column we report results using the share of restricted
videos as a measure.
Importantly, the coefficients of Log(Restricted) and Share Restricted are not significantly
different from zero, indicating that there is no correlation between a song’s popularity
and its average availability on YouTube. In both cases, the interaction with the Germany
dummy is positive but not significant. That is, even in Germany, where we observe
completely different patterns of video restrictions for exogenous reasons, sales ranks are
not affected differently.
Taken at face value, this may simply suggest that the availability of online music videos
and digital song sales are not related. However, this could also be the result of two
26The estimated coefficients of product age (as a result of strategic product introduction timing) and price
are of course potentially biased due to endogeneity. However, we include those variables to minimize a
potential omitted variable bias rather than interpret their coefficients.
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Table 1: Baseline Results
Log(Restricted) Share Restricted
Germany 0.260∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.274∗∗∗ (0.092)
Log(Restricted) -0.029 (0.022)
Germany * Log(Restricted) 0.042 (0.028)
Share Restricted -0.291 (0.248)
Germany * Share Restricted 0.349 (0.269)
Log(Age) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.178∗∗∗ (0.019)
Price Category 0.373∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.373∗∗∗ (0.022)
Australia 0.186∗∗∗ (0.072) 0.184∗∗ (0.072)
Austria 0.264∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.264∗∗∗ (0.081)
Canada -0.005 (0.029) -0.006 (0.029)
France 0.147∗ (0.079) 0.146∗ (0.079)
Italy 0.320∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.320∗∗∗ (0.080)
Spain 0.187∗∗ (0.084) 0.186∗∗ (0.084)
Switzerland 0.353∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.352∗∗∗ (0.079)
United Kingdom 0.112 (0.077) 0.110 (0.077)
Constant 2.803∗∗∗ (0.246) 2.803∗∗∗ (0.246)
Observations 503,028 503,028
R2 0.616 0.616
Dependent variable: Log(Rank) on iTunes Top 300 Songs.
Song, genre, month, calendar week and weekday fixed effects, United States is the
omitted category. Standard errors clustered on the song-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
countervailing effects that cancel each other out on average. In what follows, we propose
a number of corresponding tests. The basic idea is to look at conditions under which the
relative importance of a displacement effect or a promotion effect varies.
4.2 Displacement vs. Promotion
We can think of music as horizontally and vertically differentiated products. Initially
consumers are not perfectly informed about product characteristics, but they can gather
information by sampling, i.e. consuming the product without paying a positive price.
The closer the sample matches the product, the better informed are consumers about the
quality of the product. Conversely, access to a sample can induce consumers to consume
the sample instead of purchasing the product. The strength of this displacement effect
will depend on consumers’ perceptions about relative quality and cross-price elasticities.
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Table 2: Varying Promotion and Displacement Effect
Song Preorder Album Sales Rank
Log(Restricted) -0.029 (0.022) 0.004 (0.026)
Germany * Log(Restricted) 0.042 (0.028) 0.100∗∗ (0.040)
Preorder 0.159 (0.103)
Preorder * Log(Restricted) 0.975∗∗∗ (0.250)
Germany * Preorder -0.264 (0.230)
Germany * Preorder * Log(Restricted) -0.713∗∗∗ (0.277)
Log(Age) 0.180∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.436∗∗∗ (0.035)
Price Category / Log(Price) 0.373∗∗∗ (0.022) 1.489∗∗∗ (0.095)
Constant 2.787∗∗∗ (0.248) -2.005∗∗∗ (0.338)
Observations 503,028 222,400
R2 0.617 0.749
Dependent variables: Log(Rank) on iTunes Top 300 Songs/Albums.
Song/Album, genre, month, calendar week, weekday and country fixed effects. United States is
the omitted category. Standard errors clustered on the song/album-level in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.2.1 Varying degrees of displacement
A specific feature of the music market helps us identify these countervailing effects. Prod-
ucts are usually pre-announced before their actual release to the market. Well before the
actual release date, songs are played on the radio, music videos are shown on television,
and of course uploaded to the Internet. Consumers use radio airplay, music television
and the Internet to sample and then decide whether to purchase the song. Even before
the release, consumers can preorder the product to be shipped on the day of the release.
Preordering is not quite the same as purchasing a song after the release. We can think of
this as an implicit increase in price, because the consumer has to bear the cost of waiting
a couple of days before she can listen to the song. Accordingly, the cross-price elasticity
of product and sample changes, while the information-gathering role of sampling in the
purchase decision is not affected by the option to preorder. Consequently, more consumers
will choose to stick with the free sample, i.e. watch the music video instead of preordering
the song. We would therefore expect the displacement effect to dominate the promotional
effect, and in contrast to the result we obtained when looking at all songs, a negative effect
of sampling on sales.
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This is tested in the first column of Table 2. We introduce a three-way interaction to
investigate an additional difference in the difference-in-differences estimates. Preordering
is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether the song has been released yet.
The insignificant coefficient of Preorder suggests that preordered songs do not show sys-
tematically different sales patterns compared to purchases after the release date. While the
main effect Germany*Log(Restricted) remains insignificant and qualitatively unchanged,
the coefficient of the triple interaction Germany*Preorder*Log(Restricted) is negative and
significant. When it becomes less easy to substitute a purchase with watching a YouTube
video, sales of pre-ordered songs increase. The effect is non-negligible with an increase of
seven percent per ten percent increase in the number of restricted videos.
4.2.2 Varying degrees of promotion and displacement
Sampling can have external effects when consumers can indirectly gather information
about related products with similar characteristics. For music, two closely related products
are often on the market at the same time: songs and albums. Not only will albums usually
feature songs of relatively similar style and quality, but by definition, one song is a subset of
all songs on an album. Listening to a song on the radio or watching an online music video
therefore lets consumers gather information about album quality. This channel is of course
less direct and limited. Consider a highly stylized model to derive expectations in this
case (see table 3 for a summary). In the following we think of songs as giving standalone
utility to consumers, but also exhibiting externalities (displacement and promotion) that
can be expressed in monetary units.
If there are n songs on an album, watching an online music video can perfectly inform the
consumer only about 1/n parts of the album, but watching the video perhaps also shapes
expectations about the quality of the other n − 1 songs. In the extreme, one song may
fully reveal the quality of the corresponding album. For example, sometimes albums that
correspond closely to a song are so-called maxi-singles, with different versions or remixes
of that song but no other, fundamentally different songs.27 In most other cases where the
album consists of many different songs, a single song carries less information about the
27In iTunes’ (and our) terminology, this classifies as an album, as it is a collection of individual tracks.
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Table 3: Theoretical Promotional and Displacement Effects
Promotion (θp) Displacement (θd) Expected Net Effect (θ)
(1/n+ ν(n− 1)/n)pnδ (1/n)pnδ θp − θd = pδv(n− 1)
Songs n = δ = 1 n = δ = 1 θ = θp − θd = 0
⇒ θp = p ⇒ θd = p
Song– n = δ = 1 n = δ = 1, p′ = p+ x −x < 0
Preorders ⇒ θp = p ⇒ θd = p+ x if x > 0
Albums (1 + ν(n− 1))pδ pδ pδv(n− 1) > 0
if n > 1, δ > 0, ν > 0
rest of the album. We can think of this as a parameter ν, where 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1.
The total promotional effect can then be expressed in album price units and written as
(1/n + ν(n − 1)/n)pa, where pa is the price of the album. Albums represent bundles
(Elberse, 2010; Danaher et al., 2013), i.e. album prices are smaller than to the sum of
individual songs prices.28 We can express album prices as pa = pnδ where p is the song
price and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the bundling discount. Relative to the promotional effect of music
videos on song sales, where n = 1 with a price p ≤ pa, we expect the promotional effect
on albums to be smaller or at most equal.
While one song (or its corresponding music video) can potentially inform about album
quality, consumers cannot directly substitute listening to the album with listening to just
one song. Put differently, a music video at most replaces paid album consumption worth
one song, i.e. (1/n)pa = pδ. Because of the relative lower price of a song in the album
bundle, we also expect the displacement effect on albums to be relatively smaller or at
most equal compared to the displacement effect on songs (p ≤ (1/n)pa = pδ).
Adding up promotional and displacements effects, we can derive propositions about the
net effect, i.e. (1/n + ν(n − 1)/n)pa − (1/n)pa = pδv(n − 1). The promotional effect
always dominates the displacement effect if n > 1, ν > 0 and δ > 0. The intuition is that
displacement is limited to one song (expressed in album price units), while a music video
may inform about quality of more than one song. Accordingly, we expect the promotional
effect to prevail for albums if the music video is informative about album quality at least
28In the strict regime of the iTunes store, album prices are a function of the number of songs on an album.
See iTunes Package Music Specification 5.0, Revision 1, p. 187–188, http://tinyurl.com/lo7gj2b.
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to some (arbitrarily small) extent.
Regression results are shown in the second column of table 2. Here the dependent variable
is Log(Album Rank), Log(Age) refers to the number of days since the album release and
Log(Price) is the album price. The coefficient of Log(Restricted) remains insignificant,
the coefficient of Germany*Log(Restricted) is positive and statistically different from zero.
That is, the promotional effect prevails as expected given the iTunes pricing regime and
at least some similarity between the song and the rest of the album. The effect magnitude
is moderate, however. According to our estimates, album sales ranks decrease by one per-
cent when the number restricted videos increases by ten percent. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that the amount of information a song carries about the album is not
very large. Under the assumption that the average album priced at 9.99 USD contains
12 songs, each individually priced at 0.99 USD, the implied discount is δ = 0.84. Our
estimates then suggest that the information parameter is ν = 0.011, i.e. listening to one
song informs about one percent (≈ 0.011 ∗ 11/12) of the rest of the album.
Although the strict regime of the iTunes store limits the scope of pricing decisions, we
emphasize that it is difficult to interpret those estimates given firms may set prices en-
dogenously.
4.3 Quantifying the Effect on Sales
With information from additional regressions using external data we can shed light on
country-specific coefficients of the assumed Pareto-relationship between rankings and sales
in equation (2). This lets us infer estimates of the β’s and give some indication about the
effect on unit sales rather than ranks.
It is not possible to get data on unit sales directly from iTunes. We therefore rely on proxies
obtained from two Internet sources. Our first measure comes from digitalsalesdata.com
(DSD), a website which displays estimates of unit downloads based on a statistical model
fitted with historical data obtained from iTunes.29 Those figures are offered for the daily
29The website does not provide details about the statistical model. The owner of the website told us via email:
“Basically, what I do is get the ratio of sales from the top seller to the bottom seller, then use exponential
interpolation to fill in the gaps. I compare these to known data and modify where appropriate. The
base sales are estimated using historical data (from when I received actual sales from iTunes) and use a
separate model to handle the periodicity of sales over time and market growth trends. I used to periodically
correct the model based on published data, but it’s been 10 months since I last changed it and it seems to
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Table 4: Digital Sales and Plays
Plays per Sale
Country Correlation Mean Std. Dev.
Australia 0.93 0.96 0.40
Austria 0.98 3.02 1.41
Canada 0.90 1.85 0.66
France 0.91 1.81 0.45
Germany 0.94 3.61 1.47
Italy 0.93 3.58 1.08
Spain 0.86 8.17 2.09
Switzerland 0.98 1.34 0.47
United Kingdom 0.83 0.98 0.53
United States 0.93 0.75 0.33
Data from digitalsalesdata.com and last.fm.
top 100 songs for a large number of countries. Because the figures are predictions from
a statistical model whose parameters do not change over time, we take a snapshot of one
day for our purposes.30
Our second measure comes from last.fm, an music recommendation service that tracks
listening of more than 30 million users worldwide. After a user has installed an application
on her computer or mobile device, every song she listens to for at least 30 seconds is
tracked. Among others, last.fm tracks songs played within the iTunes application on a
desktop machine, or on an iPod, iPhone or iPad. Listening data from last.fm is therefore
likely to be highly correlated with purchases on iTunes. Aggregate statistics about the
music consumption of last.fm users can be directly accessed via the website. We obtained
three snapshots of the international top 300 weekly song charts, including the total number
of plays.31
Table 4 shows that both measures are highly correlated, although some differences between
countries are evident. The correlation is highest in Austria and Switzerland with a Pearson
coefficient of 0.98 and lowest in the United Kingdom with a Pearson coefficient of 0.83. The
average number of plays per (estimated) sale is 2.61, again with cross-country differences.
The highest coefficient by far is 8.17 in Spain, the lowest is 0.75 in the United States.
accurately predict sales most of the time now.”
30Our data was obtained on September 17th, 2013.
31The data refer to calendar weeks 34, 36 and 37 of the year 2013.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates: Ranks and Sales/Plays
Digitalsalesdata.com Last.fm
Log(Sales) -1.096∗∗∗ (0.038) -2.685∗∗∗ (0.033)
Log(Sales) * Australia -0.007 (0.058) 0.041 (0.052)
Log(Sales) * Austria 0.091 (0.067) 0.077∗ (0.046)
Log(Sales) * Canada -0.116∗∗ (0.050) -0.174∗∗∗ (0.048)
Log(Sales) * France -0.240∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.625∗∗∗ (0.046)
Log(Sales) * Germany -0.024 (0.066) 0.152∗∗∗ (0.047)
Log(Sales) * Italy -0.125∗∗ (0.057) 0.348∗∗∗ (0.051)
Log(Sales) * Spain -0.094∗∗ (0.045) 0.585∗∗∗ (0.046)
Log(Sales) * Switzerland -0.115∗ (0.066) 0.179∗∗∗ (0.050)
Log(Sales) * United Kingdom 0.149∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.297∗∗∗ (0.071)
Australia -2.603∗∗∗ (0.397) -5.777∗∗∗ (0.221)
Austria -5.994∗∗∗ (0.344) -10.463∗∗∗ (0.184)
Canada -2.703∗∗∗ (0.349) -5.058∗∗∗ (0.211)
France -2.146∗∗∗ (0.348) -8.261∗∗∗ (0.201)
Germany -3.172∗∗∗ (0.414) -4.356∗∗∗ (0.222)
Italy -4.269∗∗∗ (0.348) -8.468∗∗∗ (0.202)
Spain -4.647∗∗∗ (0.320) -7.971∗∗∗ (0.201)
Switzerland -4.383∗∗∗ (0.366) -10.510∗∗∗ (0.186)
United Kingdom -2.280∗∗∗ (0.390) -3.713∗∗∗ (0.336)
Constant 12.801∗∗∗ (0.308) 19.182∗∗∗ (0.177)
Observations 1000 9000
R2 0.965 0.954
Dependent variable: Log(Rank) on iTunes and last.fm.
Log(Plays/7) and week fixed effects in the last.fm model. United States is the omitted category.
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results from an estimation of equation (3) including country-specific coefficients for Log(Sales)
and Log(Plays) are reported in table 5. The estimate of λ is -1.096 using DSD data, with
a robust standard error of 0.038. The estimate obtained from the last.fm data is -2.685
with a robust standard error of 0.033. That is, controlling for country fixed effects, we
predict average daily unit sales of 118,154 of a song on rank one, 649 for a song on rank
300 with DSD data. Because of the much steeper slope parameter, predictions based on
last.fm data are very different at the top (1267 units for rank one), but more comparable
in the tail (151 units for rank 300). Those parameter estimates translate the results above
into a 8.0 or 19.6 percent increase in sales of preorders, and a 1.1 or 2.7 percent decrease
in sales of albums with a 10 percent increase in restricted videos.
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5 Conclusions
Using a rich data set collected from iTunes and YouTube, we use cross-country variation
and a natural experiment in Germany to identify the effect of free sampling on digital sales
of music. The results suggest that there is no effect of YouTube availability on digital sales
of songs, whereas the effect on digital sales of albums is positive. At least for albums, this
suggests that the promotional effect of YouTube videos outweighs a displacement effect.
The overall finding is that giving consumers access to free content is not necessarily hurting
sales of the same content, but can actually increase sales. This may seem surprising at
first glance. However, sampling was ever since considered an important mechanism to
increase sales in the recorded music industry. In essentially every record store (including
digital record stores such as iTunes, Amazon, and Beatport) consumers can listen to (parts
of) songs before buying. Radio stations promote songs ever since, and music television
is based on the idea that music videos create attention. The difference with streaming
websites such as YouTube, Soundcloud, or Dailymotion is that firms cannot control how
intensely consumers sample, i.e. it is not obvious that consumers may use such services as
a substitute to actual purchases. Our contribution therefore is to show that sampling can
still be an effective trigger of demand even if the firm cannot keep some consumers from
sticking to the sample instead of purchasing the product.
A potential limitation is that we only observe album chart rankings when a song of the
album is in the top 300 song charts at the same time. This may cause our album-level
estimates to be biased, because the sample only includes relatively successful albums. If
product characteristics of more successful albums are already known to more consumers,
then the promotional effect of sampling may be less pronounced than for unsuccessful
albums. This would mean that we are underestimating the promotional effect.
Instead of the reduced form approach we use, future research could study promotional and
displacement effects in a structural approach, trying to separately estimate parameters for
promotion and displacement. The main challenge would be to identify cross-price elasticity
parameters, because song and album prices are determined endogenously.
Our study makes an important contribution to the literature on sampling and digital
piracy. While it is relatively straightforward to conclude that free consumption increases
21
consumer surplus, conclusions about overall welfare are more difficult. When positive
externalities of unpaid consumption can offset forgone royalties income, sampling may be
able to increase overall welfare. If confirmed in other studies and empirical settings, this
finding may not only inform policymaking, but also firm attitudes to piracy.
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Appendix
Table A.1: iTunes Price Categories for Songs
Country Currency Low Medium High
Australia AUD 1.19 1.69 2.19
Austria EUR 0.69 0.99 1.29
Canada CAD 0.69 0.99 1.29
France EUR 0.69 0.99 1.29
Germany EUR 0.69 0.99 1.29
Italy EUR 0.69 0.99 1.29
Spain EUR 0.69 0.99 1.29
Switzerland CHF 1.10 1.60 2.20
United Kingdom GBP 0.59 0.79 0.99
United States USD 0.69 0.99 1.29
Table A.2: Top 20 Videoportals in Germany
Website Visits
Youtube.com 34,000
Myvideo.de 5,600
Movie2k.to 2,900
Videos.t-online.de 2,400
Dailymotion.com 1,800
Clipfish.de 1,600
Rtl-now.rtl.de 1,600
Kinox.to 1,300
Vimeo.com 1,300
Ardmediathek.de 1,200
Mediathek.daserste.de 840
Rtl2now.rtl2.de 830
Maxdome.de 630
Videobash.com 620
Voxnow.de 520
Diziizle.de 470
Sevenload.com 390
Metacafe.com 360
Zatoo.com 290
Atdhenet.tv 290
Source: Google Ad Planner (meedia.de).
Unique monthly visits in thousands, March 2012, excluding porn.
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